Arabs, ultra-Orthodox adopt contrasting styles in Israel's politics

One sets the Arab minority against the Jewish majority. Complicating any application of conventional minority/majority analysis is the proximity of the Palestine and the larger Arab and Muslim communities. Israeli Arabs (or Palestinians with Israeli citizenship) differ on how strongly they identify with the Palestinian cause, and with Islam (which overlaps but is distinct from nationalism), and how much they aspire to cultural and political autonomy within Israel.

Israelis who tire of Arab demands assert that they already enjoy considerable autonomy. While Arabs claim that the police are overly intrusive and harsh, others wonder at the freedom of Arabs to incite one another with extremist claims of Jewish intentions. Jewish activists protest the concern for Palestinian history in Arabic language schools, refusals to fly the national flag or sing the national anthem, and worry about an increase in Islamic dress and rhetoric.

Currently two prominent Arabs are in police custody charged with supplying information to the enemy. Some Jews are saying “it is about time.” Arabs have organized demonstrations insisting on the men’s innocence, and demanding the right to visit Arab countries, even those considered enemies by the Israeli state.

With Nakba Day following close on the heels of Jerusalem Day, there is no shortage of rhetoric from Arab and Jewish sources heating up those inclined to extremism, and frustrating those inclined to accommodation.

Within the Jewish majority, the principal divide sets the secular and Orthodox majority against the ultra-Orthodox minority. This is complicated further by continued issues of ethnicity (North Africans, Russian speakers, Ethiopians and others asserting their disadvantages), as well as the tenuous nature of the secular-Orthodox alliance against the ultra-Orthodox, and numerous fissures among the ultra-Orthodox. There are confrontations between ultra-Orthodox Sephardim and Ashkenazim, and between some of the most intense and isolated of the Ashkenazim and the rest.

Just as Nakba Day, Jerusalem Day and the arrest of two Arab activists are emphasizing the problems between Arabs and Jews, there are two issues before the courts concerned with ultra-Orthodox and other Jews.

One is a law suit, brought by Orthodox and secular Jews, demanding that ultra-Orthodox schools include in their curriculum a core of required courses teaching English, history, mathematics, and science. The intention is to prepare the children of ultra-Orthodox families for the modern workplace, and lessen the weight of welfare payments to men who avoid work for Torah study well into adulthood, if not for all of their lives.

Ultra-Orthodox defenders of the status quo demand the right to determine their children’s education. They also claim that Torah study is a superior preparation for life, and–through the support of the Almighty–more effective in defending the nation than anything done by the IDF.

Among the knottiest of issues is “whose children” are these, or who is responsible for educating them?

Other modern societies have assigned this responsibility, or at least a major part of it, to the state and its political process. Judaism is a communal enterprise with a long history of elevating the community over individuality. Thus, the issue becomes “which community?” In the core of this dispute is the tendency of ultra-Orthodox to elevate their rabbinical leaders above elected officials of the state.

The second ultra-Orthodox issue in the headlines is the trial of the “starving mother.” She is an ultra-Orthodox, English speaking woman accused of mistreating her children, including the starvation of one child to the point of making him a vegetable. The woman’s congregation set itself off from other ultra-Orthodox by their demonstrations against police involvement in their affairs. Recently announced, but still awaiting the endorsement of the court, is a plea bargain involving her admission of guilt, three years house arrest, continued psychological and medical treatment, and separation from her children except for visits supervised by social workers.

Critics call the plea bargain a travesty reflecting the excessive leniency given to ultra-Orthodox criminals. The woman’s rabbi is calling it a facade offered by prosecutors who knew they did not have a case that would convince a court.

Israel deals with these social fissures by allowing to each of the “outgroups” considerable autonomy in fact, if not in law. The ultra-Orthodox do considerably better than Arabs in terms of their receipt of public resources, and in their freedom from the police and judiciary. These advantages derive from the Jewish identity shared with secular Israelis, as well as ultra-Orthodox avoidance of the violence promoted by Arab activists. 

The ultra-Orthodox advantage also reflects from their participation in mainstream politics. Their party leaders criticize the secular establishment, but also trade support of the government for resources and the recognition of their special status. 

When Arab politicians learn the same skill, the flow of resources to their communities will increase. If that happens, Israelis who are neither Arab nor ultra-Orthodox may continue their animosity to “those people,” but the society shared by all will be more viable.

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Sharkansky is professor emeritus of political science at Hebrew University