JERUSALEM–The New York Times has continued its intensive coverage of Afghanistan with a lengthy and detailed report on how the president came to his decisions about increasing the commitment of troops, along with a conception of withdrawal. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=Afghanistan&st=cse
In the nature of things, one cannot have total confidence in this report of closed meetings. However, the article rings true to what we know about things like this, and what we know about this president, to accept it as credible enough for our purposes.
And although we have nothing like the current details available to the president and his advisers, we can put this information in the context of what is known about Afghanistan to evaluate what was decided, and its prospects for success.
I offer my assessments with considerable respect for the president’s intelligence and intentions. I have criticized his actions in several of these columns, but have not signed on to the view that he is evil. I begin and end this note with a view that the task concerned with Afghanistan and Pakistan is daunting, and most likely beyond the capacity of him, his advisers, the American military, and its allies.
My view rests on a general knowledge of the society and economy of the country, and the difficult topography which has not changed since I was held up by bandits while being driven through the Khyber Pass years ago.
The parameters I perceive are apparent in recent articles of the New York Times and other sources. They are:
- The lack of social cement between regions, ethnic groups, tribes, and extended families
- Loyalties are to family and whoever is currently dominant in the locality, and shift with circumstances
- The society is fractured to such a degree that no central government has controlled it. “Afghanistan” is an intellectual construct, rather than a country with a government in the conventional sense
- Americans and other outsiders are viewed with suspicion, fear, and/or animosity, and should not rely on the locals
- President Hamid Karzai is no less corrupt and no more reliable than other power holders
- The region of Pakistan that abuts Afghanistan shares these traits, and is not under the control of the government in Islamabad
- Islam is the prevailing religion, and the culture is “traditional” in the extreme. Rights of women and others do not count for much, if anything. I know of no reason to alter my conception of Afghan education since meeting a man who thought he could travel to America by bus.
- Opium is the engine of the Afghan economy that provides the resources supporting war lords or bandit chiefs, who get their armaments from who knows where over porous borders and terrain that defy control by indigenous or foreign authorities
These traits frustrated British invaders in the 19th century, and Soviet forces in the 1980s. What happened to the Soviet Union gave Afghanistan the reputation as a destroyer of empires. Afghanistan will frustrate American efforts, no matter how many hours President Obama and his impressive array of civilian and military personnel have spent in gathering intelligence, planning their strategy, and setting up alliances and logistics.
The American military has been active in the country for more than eight years since it was identified as the source of 9-11. American casualties are nothing like they were in Vietnam, and the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan may keep those casualties modest. However, the financial cost will be awesome. Estimates released in recent days mention one trillion dollars spread over a number of years, or about the cost projected for the president’s health reforms. Current planning includes a commitment to withdraw, but this is not firm, and raises the issue of credibility.
The unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable questions are:
- Will the increased commitment of troops be enough to defeat, control, or minimize the Taliban, al Quaida and other hostile forces?
- Will the military forces, and continued political efforts manage to keep a government in Pakistan from losing control of its country and its nuclear weapons?
- If the answers to these questions are not positive, what will remain of the war against terror?
- Will the financial outlays impinge on the president’s domestic commitments, especially health care? The question concerns not so much the availability of money or the government’s capacity to borrow, but the political task of persuading Congress to continue supporting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (where withdrawal is uncertain) as well as the president’s domestic agenda.
Being the lone superpower, and the impact of 9-11 puts a great deal on the agenda of whoever is in the White House. The style of Barack Obama may be 180 degrees from that of George W. Bush. The essential problems are the same, however, and it is not clear if Obama can handle his tasks with greater success than Bush.
What would I do in Obama’s shoes?
My macro analysis says withdraw ground troops, and rely on the threat of massive damage from the air to discourage anything like a repeat of 9-11. This might relieve the pressure on Pakistan, and let its government get back to managing the bulk of its country except for the problematic border region that resembles Afghanistan.
This strategy would not satisfy the president’s fear of “losing Afghanistan,” or his domestic critics. It would sacrifice whatever aspirations remain for reforming Afghanistan and improving the condition of women and others. The strategy of “massive damage from the air” would provoke opposition from Americans and others concerned with the immorality of war.
Ultimately I would be stuck with the same dire problems as the president, saved only by the knowledge that no one would put me in his shoes.
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Sharkansky is professor emeritus of political science at Hebrew University