By Steve Kramer
Eyal Zisser is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University (TAU). Professor Zisser recently spoke to the English Speaking Friends of TAU at their monthly lecture on the present situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria.
In a recent article from the Middle East Quarterly, Zisser wrote: “The failure of the Bush and the Obama administrations to topple Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad goes a long way to explaining Washington’s declining Middle Eastern position. United by a distinct lack of vision, as opposed to hopes and wishful thinking, as well as determination and a coherent plan of action, these otherwise very different administrations helped erode America’s stature in the region. Widely seen as a declining superpower that has lost belief in itself and its leading role in the world, Washington earns neither fear nor respect in the Middle East.”
That’s a pretty heavy indictment from a respected, objective historian. However, according to Zisser, the revolutions throughout the Arab countries took even the experts by surprise, probably including Syrian strongman Assad. The Egyptians were also unprepared. Mubarak was used to violent demonstrations, but not a revolution (January, 2011). Mubarak got the boot (with a little help from President Obama) but Egypt quickly fell back into dictatorship, first by the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood (which Obama supported!) and now the army led by General Abdel Fattah Sisi, who at least is Western oriented.
Just two months before Egypt erupted, Bashar al-Assad said that Syria is not Egypt, meaning there would never be a revolt in Syria against him. The uprising came quickly (March, 2011), yet Assad is still there. His strong position does not give him immunity but it doesn’t put him out of harm’s way either. Assad is very close to and dependent on Iran and its proxy, Hizbullah, and shares their tactics: no peace with Israel and no relations with America.
Zisser asked the question, Why is Assad’s fate different from Mubarak’s? He told us that in Syria ethnic divisiveness and ethnic cleansing are rampant. 40% of the population are minorities, including Assad’s ruling clan, the Alewites, who are a breakaway sect of Shia Islam, Druze, Kurds, and Christians. The minorities prefer Assad as the “bad one they know” compared to a Sunni Islamist regime, which they fear even more.
The revolt in Egypt was about Mubarak. He was the target for all of the political parties. But in Syria, the army can’t separate itself from Assad. Most high ranking officers are Alewites, including many relatives of Assad. The officers need Assad to protect themselves and relatively few have changed sides.
“The outbreak of revolution in Syria in March 2011 was met with silence in Washington. Instead of issuing a resolute call to the Syrian ruler to step down, as in the pressure exerted on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February, the administration took several long weeks to articulate its policy toward the Syrian revolution. On March 27, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that Syria was different from Libya since ‘there’s a different [sic] leader in Syria now. Many of the members of Congress of both parties [including then-Senator Kerry] who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad]’s a reformer.’” (Middle East Quarterly)
Unlike in Egypt, the Syrian revolution started in the periphery and rural areas and mostly remains there. There are at least 300 separate revolutionary groups. The majority of the population remains neutral, which means that the status quo – unending fighting – is likely to continue. Zisser said that there is no better alternative for the majority, because 20-30% of the people are militants willing to fight and die for their cause. Compromise is unlikely since the rebels have had some success. The mostly-Sunni opposition controls many small towns while Assad’s forces still cling to enclaves where their adherents live.
Zisser compared Assad’s military situation to that of Israel in 1948. The Jews were confronted by Arab gangs who never organized. This allowed the relatively highly-organized Jewish forces to triumph. He mentioned our youth: the Israeli boy is drafted into the army and serves his three year stint. He then chills out in Asia or S. America, with his friends or girlfriend, and returns to Israel to study or work.
In Syria, the Assad regime’s brutal reaction to demonstrations resulted in the sectarian fragmentation of the society. Unlike his Israeli counterpart, the Syrian boy has nothing else to do except fight. And he has been joined by outsiders, mostly from Lebanon and Iran. The result is that most casualties have been caused by internecine fighting between diverse militant groups, while Assad survives. All of his diplomats are still on board and salaries are still being paid.
What about Assad’s long term survival? Assad’s situation has changed from losing momentum to the opposition, to winning back territory when the Lebanese terror group, Hizbullah, on orders from Iran, intervened to help turn the tide in Assad’s favor. Obama’s “fiasco” in not punishing Assad for violating Obama’s “red line” against the use of chemical weapons allows Assad to do anything except use chemical weapons. Fighting will continue. Eventually, Zusser said, the opposition will tire, their funders will tire, and Assad will probably retain power, but not over the entire country.
Zisser sees Israelis as preferring a continuation of fighting, with Assad, “the dictator we know,” sticking around for some time and maintaining secure borders with Israel, as his father did. Eventually Israel will have to think about what to do yet again, but not in the short term.
In the conclusion to his article in the Middle Eastern Quarterly, Zisser gives his overall impression of America’s status in the Middle East: “What subsequent administrations have failed to understand is that what Arabs resent most is not the U.S. invasion of Iraq or even support for Israel … Washington’s international state of success and status is, despite whatever current economic problems it faces, a constant reminder of Arab decline from its glorious past. The United States is seen as the successor to Britain and other colonial powers and, therefore, shall be an enemy forever.
“As long as there is no introspection among Arabs regarding the causes of their decline; as long as the only explanation offered for this decline remains a U.S.-Zionist conspiracy to break and weaken the ‘Arab world,’ this rejection of good-faith efforts by the West will remain as it is. What might alter the situation [of the Arabs] is not necessarily a change in U.S. policy toward Israel but rather a change from within [Arab society].”
Wait for it …
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This article was previously published by the Jewish Times of South Jersey. Author Kramer’s works may also be read on the website, www.encounteringisrael.com